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“Forward and Not Forgetting” – How do Workers’ Memories 
Impact International Solidarity? 
 
 





Collective remembering in multinational corporations is a field at the intersection of  social memory 
studies and organisational science that has so far been widely neglected within the academic 
community. Drawing on empirical findings, this article analyses the impact of  the organisational 
memories of  South African workers’ representatives in processes of  cross-border coordination. 
What is found is that strong ties of  international solidarity, dating from the 1970s and 1980s, serve as 
an interpretative background against which today’s situation (which is constituted through different 
frameworks such as the end of  apartheid and economic globalisation) is evaluated critically. 
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“Not man or men but the struggling, oppressed class itself   
is the depository of  historical knowledge” (Benjamin, 2007: 260). 
 
As Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (1959) claim at the beginning of  their Communist Manifesto, history 
unfolds as a struggle between the social classes. While much has been written about both societal 
developments and the struggles that drive it (Burawoy, 1985), what has been neglected – not least due 
to a macro-sociological bias in (post-) Marxist labour relations research – are the ways in which 
actors perceive these temporal dimensions. Drawing on a case of  international worker 
representation, this paper aims to complement this view by reconstructing the perspective of  the 
actors involved.1 
The impact of  social memory on multinational corporations (MNCs) is a field at the 
intersection of  social memory and organisation studies that to date has been largely (if  unjustifiably) 
neglected. As Gabriel (2000: 169) notes, there is “one particular mode in which organizational 
members seek to make sense of  their daily experiences – namely, by juxtaposing them to an 
organizational past and comparing them [with] it”. The object of  this study is specifically the 
meaning of  social memory in the coordination of  international workers’ representation. Drawing on 
                                                             
1 I would like to thank Barbara Laubenthal, Kati King and two anonymous reviewers for valuable comments 
and suggestions. 
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the case of  Volkswagen (VW) we shall describe how workers’ memories in South Africa and 
Germany impact their collective ability to maintain a solidaristic cooperation.  
We shall reconstruct three problematic instances in their cooperative relationship over the past 
fifteen years – a shift to a co-managerial orientation of  the works council; a particular strike situation 
in 1999–2000; and working-time flexibilisation in the course of  the economic crisis. Through this 
process, it can be shown that the memory of  the cross-border relationship under apartheid 
influences contemporary perceptions. These perceptions serve as the interpretative background 
against which today’s relationship is regarded as problematic. 
The next section introduces general social scientific insights about cross-border coordination 
in MNCs and social memory studies, and provides a theoretical framework to be applied to the 
empirical material. After illustrating the study’s methodological conception, the subsequent section 
introduces the empirical findings. A final section contains some theoretical conclusions and 
considerations for future research. 
 
 
Organisational Memory and Coordination of Interest Representation in MNCs 
If  organisational activities are shaped by the actions of  their members and stakeholders, a 
sociological perspective needs to give credit to individual perceptions and motivations (Schütz, 1967). 
Since the interpretation of  past events provides us with the experiences necessary to coordinate our 
action through anticipation of  the expectations of  others (Mead, 1934), the notion of  memory holds 
a central position in this reconstructive process (Poulton, 2005: 6). 
Although both organisation studies (Scott and Davis, 2006) and research on cultural memory 
(Erll and Nünning, 2008) constitute well-established disciplines, synergetic attempts have emerged 
only recently.2 Although Dawson (2014: 285), in his conceptual overview, justifiably attests to a “poor 
conceptualization of  time” in organisation studies, recent years have brought about a shift in 
scholarly attention towards issues of  temporality (Cropper and Palmer, 2008). While promising 
conceptualisations have been proposed from a general theoretical angle (for example, Hernes, 2014), 
to date there has been no systematic consideration of  social memory in connection with 
organisations. Accordingly, Hibbert and Huxham (2010: 525) consider the meaning of  memory to be 
“generally underresearched in organization studies”. At the same time, a similar bias towards 
organisations is acknowledged by Rowlinson et al. (2009) for the field of  social memory studies. 
Drawing on the case of  cross-border coordination in MNCs, in the following section we argue that 
the notion of  social memory is crucial in order to understand organisational conduct. 
 
 
Theoretical Framework – Social Memory and its Impact on Organisations as “Negotiated 
Orders” in MNCs 
Within the field of  organisation studies, Connoly and Dolan (2011: 9) distinguish between two 
dimensions of  the study of  organisational memory. First, there is scholarly interest in “the 
importance of  considering the institutional environment when examining organizational change and 
                                                             
2 As two of  the few earlier exceptions, see Gabriel (2000) and Walsh and Ungson (1991), as well as the newly 
established journal Management and Organizational History. 
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stability”. Berger and Luckmann (1966) have pointed out how institutionalised stocks of  knowledge 
shape the self-concepts and mutual expectations – among other things – of  actors. While this 
knowledge order also serves as a central reference point for the conduct of  and within organisations 
according to a common differentiation (Pries, 2008), organisational units themselves can also be seen 
as an important dimension of  analysis. Accordingly, Walsh and Ungson (1991: 61) understand 
organisational memory as the amount of  “stored information from an organization’s history that can 
be brought to bear on present decisions”. 
Additionally, there is a standpoint-dependent shape that concrete memories might take 
depending on who is remembering, and so we must underline the potentially contested character of  
memories negotiated between various actors (Straub, 2008: 218). Moreover, collective memory does 
not always provide evidence of  the historical causes of  current situations. However, the ex-post 
interpretation of  past events becomes strikingly relevant when collective decisions are taken. 
As no organisation can durably exist in complete independence from its environment, there is 
a structural interrelation of  collective memory institutionalised in societies’ knowledge orders and 
patterns of  organisational memory. Processes of  negotiating the implications of  perceived past 
events take concrete shape in the context of  social interactions. Accordingly, the institutional setting 
of  a specific frame of  reference (for example, a nation state), as well as the concrete organisational 
context, gain significance as two complementary frameworks within which memories become 
practically relevant. 
When talking about globalisation, MNCs are usually identified as carriers of  the development 
of  “a worldwide social relationship which links distinct localities in such a way that local happenings 
are shaped by events occurring miles away and vice versa“ (Giddens, 1990: 64). Reflection on the 
cross-border activities of  MNCs takes place in two academic branches. International business studies 
(IBS) approach MNCs from an economic perspective, focusing on knowledge transfer as it applies to 
activities aimed at profit-making in different environments, while a second branch starts from a 
social science perspective (Sitkin and Bowen, 2010). Second, the field of  social science stands out 
through division of  labour between those scholars who focus on management-level analysis and 
conceptualise worker-representatives as stakeholders (Becker-Ritterspach and Dörrenbächer, 2011), 
and those focusing on the activities of  representatives, such as works councils (Hertwig, Pries and 
Rampeltshammer, 2009) or international framework agreements (Telljohann, 2009). 
While the approaches differ in terms of  theoretical framework – a (Marxist) theoretical 
heritage in the social science literature and a (Smithian) economics background in the field of  
business studies – a common reference point can be found in the analysis of  cross-border 
coordination. As MNCs operate under different conditions depending on the national setting (Hall 
and Soskice, 2001), a need for coordination can arise, for example, from differences in national 
education systems and occupational cultures (Streeck, 2011). Moreover, organisational structure can 
also be an influential factor in coordination issues (such as relocating the manufacturing of  a product 
within the company network). 
Understanding collective memory as “shared by a collective of  people with a common cultural 
identity” (Assmann, 2008: 111) clarifies how this has a crucial meaning for cross-border coordination 
in MNCs. If  national cultures and historically developed knowledge shape perceptions, members 
from different countries can thus only draw on a body of  common experience to the extent that 
their particular knowledge systems overlap. While original cultural orientations might differ between 
various subsidiaries, regular interaction might help people to gather enough knowledge about their 
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interaction partners to better understand their motives or even contribute to a shared set of  values 
(Festing and Maletzky and Festing, 2011). While cross-border coordination at management level is 
often institutionalised through regular use of  virtual communication technologies, the situation for 
workers’ representatives turns out to be less promising in many cases, for various reasons. 
First, the organisational structure of  MNCs does not usually designate explicit hierarchies 
between international workers’ representatives. While central management can formulate binding 
obligations for host-country managers, workers’ representatives usually cannot. Although internal 
management conflicts are not foreign to IBS or social scientific approaches (Dörrenbächer and 
Gammelgaard, 2011; Rothman and Friedman, 2001), a mutual interest in company profits can be 
assumed as a common reference point. Second, while subsidiary representatives uphold a more or 
less constant cooperation with head office representatives, they depend in the first place on their 
local reference groups – local workers, union organisations and management (Hauser-Ditz et al., 
2010). Especially through international competition between subsidiaries, identification with the local 
workforce is likely to increase further. A third potential reason lies in the relatively scarce resources 
that labour representatives can use for the purposes of  internationalisation. 
On a conceptual level, these points illustrate the possible impact of  social memory on 
international workers’ representation. The central notion here is the issue of  mutual trust: lf  actors 
act based on memories, “trust ultimately represents an idiosyncratic accomplishment … in their 
stream of  experience and interpretation” (Möllering, 2006: 155). A retrospective look at the former 
working relationship, therefore, serves as a background against which actions are interpreted and 
chosen. For international workers’ representation, a central challenge arises from the embeddedness 
of  the companies’ units in different institutional environments. These settings differ not only with 
regard to their particular history as a development of  “objective social facts”, but also in terms of  
the specific interpretations of  these histories. The next section illustrates the theoretical approach 
used to conceptualise this in the inquiry process. 
 
  
Theoretical Framework: Negotiated Memory Orders in MNCs 
Analysis of  social memory in MNCs requires an (at least) twofold perspective on the institutional 
contexts and the processes of  interaction taking place within and between the units. The Negotiated 
Order approach, developed by Strauss (1978) and others, enables us to take such a perspective. 
Rejecting the idea of  organisations shaped via static structures or fixed internal roles, Strauss 
emphasises their continuous negotiation through flows of  action. The Negotiated Order is thus 
understood as the 
 
sum total of  the organization’s rules and policies, along with whatever agreements, 
understandings, pacts, contracts, and other working arrangements currently obtained. These 
include the agreements at every level of  the organization, of  every clique and coalition, and 
include covert as well as overt agreements (Strauss, 1978: 6). 
 
To analyse the interplay between structural conditions and situated actions, Strauss distinguishes 
between three dimensions of  social life. First, a structural context contains relevant conditions that 
enable and restrict action capacities found within concrete situations. Accordingly, Maines (1982: 
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270) defines the structural context of  an organisation as “the larger transcending circumstances in 
which negotiation contexts exist”. This negotiation context can be understood as a framework of  
social actions characterised by various features (Strauss, 1978: 98f). For the purpose of  this research, 
emphasis will be placed on the balance of  power between the parties involved, the respective stakes 
within the negotiations, the visibility of  the transactions pursued by other actors, the number and 
complexity of  the issues that are being negotiated, the clarity or legitimacy boundaries of  the issues 
negotiated and actors’ opportunities to opt out of  ongoing negotiations. Finally, at the bottom level, 
the Negotiated Order is constituted through the actions of  involved actors. In this dimension, 
Strauss draws on Shibutani’s (1955) concept of  social worlds. According to Clarke (1991: 131) these 
are “groups with shared commitments to certain activities, sharing resources of  many kinds to 
achieve their goals, and building shared ideologies about how to go about their business”. 
The notion of  social worlds points to patterns of  interaction and perception within certain 
social groups. It is within these social worlds that actors develop and transform their perceptions of  
negotiated issues. For their members, these social worlds thus provide a “structure which permits 
reasonable anticipation of  the behavior of  others, [and] hence, an area in which one may act with a 
sense of  security and confidence” (Shibutani, 1951: 566). While social worlds do not only deal with 
internal issues, but take into account environmental events, opinions and attitudes about issues that 
might affect their constituency, they are largely formed internally: “Through extended 
communication, participants in social worlds characteristically generate, adopt, or adapt ideologies 
about how their work should be done and debate about both their own activities and others’ actions 
that may affect them” (Clarke, 1991: 131–2). 
We can thus conclude that social memory comprises particular viewpoints on history rooted in 
processes of  sense-making within particular groups. At the same time, the broader reference frame 
in which these memories gain their specific meanings is constituted by the broader structural context. 
In the perspective taken in this article, the structural context comprises both the national settings in 
which actors are operating and the market situation of  the company in general. By reconstructing the 
interplay of  the three levels (structural context, negotiation context and social worlds), the following 
sections show how social memories influence cross-border coordination among workers’ 




The empirical basis of  the study is constituted by data gathered in a research project on international 
labour regulation at Volkswagen between German headquarters and the South African subsidiary. 
Between October 2010 and January 2011, sixteen semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
people from the two countries. These included management officials, members of  the local trade 
unions – Industriegewerkschaft Metall (IG Metall) and the National Union of  Metalworkers of  
South Africa (NUMSA) – and the shop-floor workers’ representatives. While most interviews were 
conducted in the interviewees’ offices, one group interview with several shop stewards was carried 
out in a common room. One representative from NUMSA was met in a restaurant in Johannesburg. 
At the time all interview partners were employed by the organisations they represented. A total of  
17.5 hours of  audio material was gathered. 
The original point of  departure was information provided by a German works council 
representative, according to whom the working relationship with the South African colleagues was 
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somewhat unstable. This instability, according to him, expressed itself, among other things, in 
unanswered calls to the South African representatives. He also pointed to what he believed to be 
internal struggles within the South African workers’ representative body. Accordingly, the goal of  the 
research was to understand actors’ perceptions of  mutual cooperation in order to identify possible 
obstacles to coordinating activities. 
 
 
Labour Regulation at VW: A German–South African Perspective 
In order to highlight the meaning of  social memory for cross-border coordination of  workers’ 
representatives in Volkswagen, this section illustrates the various dimensions of  the Negotiated 
Order approach. First, the institutional settings for labour regulation in the two countries will be 
introduced in order to provide an understanding of  the framework conditions that shape local 
agency. This is followed by a discussion of  the negotiation context between the German company 
and the South African subsidiary, which clarifies the understanding of  the framework conditions 
under which representatives engage in their concrete social interaction. 
 
 
Structural Context: Labour Relations in Germany and South Africa 
As is widely known, keywords such as “social partnership” or “corporatism” are applied to 
characterise the German system of  labour relations. That system is based on the pillars of  general 
societal wealth and strong welfare institutions, stable negotiation relations between capital and 
labour, and industrial relations institutionalised in a system of  shop-floor and board-related co-
determination and collective bargaining. The particular institutional setting of  German capitalism not 
only shapes the overall structures of  economic organisation, but comprises the self-understanding of  
its protagonists – state, capital and labour (Streeck, 2009). 
Despite declining membership rates and diminishing collective bargaining coverage, the recent 
reaction of  the social partners to the economic crisis illustrates the flexibility of  German labour 
relations (Thelen, 2013). This trend towards establishing the company level as the primary arena for 
such decentralisation was initially set in motion in the early 1980s, when IG Metall agreed to 
negotiate working-time reductions on the shop floor. This trend continued to undermine central 
agreements through German trade unions agreeing to so-called hardship clauses in the 1990s. 
Implemented under the Schröder government, the Pforzheimer Agreement of  2004 enables works 
councils to negotiate wages independently, at lower rates than the regular agreement. Another 
important element of  this flexible regime is the application of  flexible working-time arrangements 
and contract work during the crisis. 
At the Uitenhage plant in South Africa, different framework conditions persist. Like practically 
every other aspect of  society, South African labour relations have been shaped by the apartheid 
system. A high concentration of  income and private wealth, combined with a poor education system 
and relatively little public welfare, have resulted in fairly limited cohesion within South African 
society. Critics identify a post-colonial regime based on institutionalised oppression of  black and 
coloured citizens: despite all the affirmative action laws, one of  the core outcomes of  apartheid is 
the particular interdependence between race and class inequalities found in South Africa: poverty and 
unemployment are in the first place perceived as “black” and “coloured” problems (Roberts, Kivilu 
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and Davids, 2010). 
Concerning labour relations and work organisation, the implications are summarised by 
Edward Webster and his colleagues as an “apartheid workplace regime”: “The effects of  this regime 
– low trust, low levels of  skill, a reluctance to identify with the goals of  the enterprise and, above all, 
the persistence of  the racial division of  labour that characterised apartheid – continue into the 
present” (Webster, Mashilo and Masondo, 2009: 19). 
As occupational backgrounds and social mobility have long been structured along racial lines, 
the field of  South African labour relations is not structured by the category of  class alone, but also 
by race and the particular interdependence between the two. 
In this context, NUMSA stands out due to its very centralised structure which concentrates 
power over the affiliated shop-floor representatives. Moreover, a relatively strict socialist orientation 
leads to what could be called a general “united front” approach that frames collective workers’ 
interests as union interests, which company representatives then have to pursue. As the South 
African labour movement struggled for decades – and increasingly from the 1960s – to topple 
apartheid, a particular union culture developed, largely focused on antagonistic and confrontational 
policies (Bendix, 2010). Because this resistance fostered the broad social involvement of  a wide range 
of  actors, the most efficient form of  organisation for the unions was centralised structures. While 
this approach proved historically to be an appropriate way to oppose the apartheid government, the 
idea of  a centralised union remains contested. As the empirical findings show, this counts especially 
against the background of  a progressing shop-floor orientation in MNCs, which relocates the 
resolution of  concrete issues from the trade unions to a company-centred frame. 
As a brief  comparison of  the structural settings in the two countries shows, the framework 
conditions for labour regulation differ strongly in Germany and South Africa. While the notion of  
“social partnership” in Germany describes a traditional institutional framework based on general 
societal wealth and negotiation routines between the parties involved, which involve high levels of  
mutual trust, the situation in South Africa is still haunted by a “ghost of  colonial rule” (Buhlungu, 
2010: 194), which makes cooperative relations comparatively improbable. While one core feature of  
the German system is the mutual trust that shapes management–employee relations, the 
development of  such a bond is very complicated against the background of  contemporary power 
relations in South Africa’s economy and society. Based on a comparative illustration, the next section 
focuses on the negotiation context at VW. Subsequently, three instances of  international cooperation 
among workers’ representatives will be introduced, drawing on a social worlds perspective. 
 
 
Negotiation Context: International Labour Regulation at VW 
The degree of  internationalisation found at Volkswagen has been reached by very few corporations. 
In 2011 (when the research was carried out), VW ran sixty-two subsidiaries in twenty-two countries, 
twelve of  which were located in Germany. Within the international production network, central 
steering capacities are situated in the powerful headquarters in Wolfsburg. 
Volkswagen’s involvement in South Africa dates back to 1956, making it the second oldest 
foreign subsidiary in the country. In 2011 the company employed about 400 000 workers, 5 000 of  
whom were working at the South African plant located in the city of  Uitenhage in Eastern Cape 
province. With an average daily production of  650 units, the total value of  exports added up to 455 
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million Euros in 2008 plus 182 million Euros for components. Against the background of  a total 
turnover of  127 billion Euros in 2010, the economic significance of  the South African plant is 
comparatively low. Given that China and Latin America have become focal points of  company 
engagement (Pries and Seeliger, 2012), recent developments of  company internationalisation are also 
reflected in the amount of  attention directed towards claims and issues raised by South African 
representatives in the company. 
VW’s works council is probably the most powerful company-level organ of  labour interests in 
Germany. Due to specific legislation that grants the workers an equal share of  seats on the company 
board, a solid working relationship between IG Metall and the works council on the one hand and 
management on the other has been established over the past decades. Moreover, company 
internationalisation has since early on been accompanied by an alliance of  IG Metall representatives 
in VW. The Arbeitskreis Internationale Solidarität (InterSoli) was formed in 1982 in order to learn 
about the situation of  colleagues at overseas plants (back then in Mexico, Brazil and South Africa). 
Subsequently, InterSoli has engaged in a wide range of  activities to support Volkswagen workers 
abroad (for example, charity collections among the German workforce and agenda-setting in the 
German media, but also through direct action, as in the case of  South Africa). Against the 
background of  the recent rounds of  European Union enlargement, the main engagement of  
InterSoli has shifted towards the subsidiaries in central and eastern European countries. 
Regarding labour relations at the German subsidiaries, the Volkswagen company particularly 
stands out due to “a high degree of  ‘jointness’ between management and works councils in company 
policy, which exceed the formal codetermination framework of  industrial relations in Germany 
(Jürgens, 2002: 10). 
As various examples from the past two decades show, this particular model of  labour relations 
has enabled both worker and management representatives to cope with the problems caused by 
increasing international competition. Measures such as the implementation of  flexible working 
models can thus be understood as compromises that keep production capacities in the home country 
and help to secure the jobs of  German VW workers, who in turn had to make concessions in terms 
of  their wages and working time. Here, a moderating role between management and the workers was 
taken by the VW works council, as well as by IG Metall on the employee side. This cooperative 
working relationship is also reflected in measures such as the Volkswagen innovation fund, which 
grants the works council 20 million Euros per annum to invest independently in R&D projects to 
open up new market opportunities for the company (Baum-Ceisig and Osterloh, 2011). It has 
recently been the ambition of  German management and works council to foster such initiatives in 
the company’s overseas plants. Here, an international framework agreement called the Charter of  
Labor Relations is meant to prospectively grant VW workers the right to exercise plant-level 
codetermination, similar to the German model (Baum-Ceisig and Osterloh, 2013). 
In late 2010, the council consisted of  twenty shop stewards. From a legislative perspective, it 
serves the same purposes as its German counterpart. However, framework conditions give the 
concrete policies a different shape: while the works council independently influences company 
policies and interacts at eye level with IG Metall, a clear hierarchy can be identified between the shop 
steward council at VWSA and NUMSA. Combined with the socialist orientation, the lack of  trust 
between employees and employers, relatively low wages and the anti-capitalist orientation of  the 
centralist union, the framework conditions for negotiating labour policies at the plant often take a 
more conflictual shape. 
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The relationship between German and South African workers’ representatives at Volkswagen 
is far from being a new phenomenon, dating back to the late 1970s, when IG Metall started pushing 
for measures of  international solidarity to support South African workers under apartheid: 
“Volkswagen is the only automobile company in South Africa where significant long-term 
relationships developed between the black trade union within the subsidiary and the trade union and 
works councils in Germany” (Bolsmann, 2007: 107). 
In 1980 a delegation of  German representatives from the works council organised a trip to 
Uitenhage. It was this worker-led investigation of  South African work and employment conditions 
that brought the issue of  equal treatment onto the agenda of  the Wolfsburg-based management. As 
a consequence, the company took the lead in creating more progressive conditions by, for example, 
providing occupational training for black craftsmen, beginning in 1981. 
As the legitimacy of  the racist policies maintained by South African government gradually 
decreased in the 1980s, struggles against apartheid became more and more intense. Within the broad 
front of  civil society resistance, trade unions continued to play a protagonist role, not least through 
using the shop floor as an arena for political organisation. Remarkably, working-class alliances in 
these struggles were not necessarily limited to a local or national frameworks. Especially at 
Volkswagen, the works council and IG Metall continued with solidarity actions. For example, as head 
of  the works council, Walter Hiller implemented security measures for South African union leader 
John Gomomo, after receiving death threats from the racist terrorist organisation “White Wolves”. 
Practical solidarity was also exercised through financial support. As the anti-apartheid movement was 
in large part operating illegally, representatives from the works council and IG Metall established 
special channels to transfer money into the country, hidden in belts and clothing. This political 
solidarity was complemented by a close friendship between Gomomo and Hans-Jürgen Uhl, who 
served as head of  the German works council well into the 1990s. As underlined by scholars such as 
Gumbrell-McCormick (2000: 408) and Bolsmann (2006), at this early stage German support was 
highly appreciated by the South African workers. 
In the course of  the 1990s, two developments caused a shift in labour relations at Volkswagen 
South Africa. While, compared with the rest of  the country, the company had for quite some time 
been pursuing a more equal-treatment-oriented labour policy, the end of  apartheid caused a general 
trend towards more participatory patterns of  work organisation (Maller, 1994). Secondly, another 
factor contributed even more strongly to a shift of  German attention away from Uitenhage. While 
the first parallel production of  a series had already been launched in the mid-1980s at the company’s 
Spanish plants, the fall of  communism increased the pressure on VW to expand into the central and 
eastern European labour and consumer markets (Jürgens and Krzywdzinski, 2010). 
At the same time, VW intensified its involvement in other regions, such as China and South 
America. As the German works council had to invest major efforts in the establishment of  
representative structures at both European and global level, the focal points of  workers’ 
representation shifted. 
These developments in the company’s new integrated production network also affected the 
situation at VWSA. With regard to recent history after the end of  apartheid, we can identify three 
clusters of  problems in which this constellation has led to tensions between German and South 
African labour representatives. For example, the latter complained about a lack of  solidaristic 
support from the Germans. At the same time, German labour representatives who were trying to 
play a moderating role between South African workers’ representatives and management showed 
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signs of  frustration, referring to the mainly antagonistic positions of  their South African colleagues. 
As will be shown, the perception of  the relationship under apartheid shaped expectations in a way 
that has made cooperation a frustrating experience for the southern colleagues. 
 
Co-management as a reaction to international competition 
A first area in which frictions in international cooperation occurred is the reactions to increased 
international competition. Here, starting with the so-called China Export Agreement in 1992, there 
was a threefold impact (Bolsmann, 2006: 173) on labour regulation at VWSA. First, reference to 
international competition within the company’s production network became a regular part of  the 
discourse on labour regulation at the plant. Second, a general flexibilisation of  work organisation 
increased pressure on the workforce. Third, the creation of  additional jobs at the plant was related to 
measures to cut labour costs. 
As described above, the German reaction to this new constellation comprised an overall turn 
towards co-managerial policies, pursued by the works council and IG Metall. A similar orientation 
among South African representatives was ruled out by a NUMSA official from the Johannesburg 
headquarters. According to him, alliances with management cannot be in the interest of  a trade 
union: 
 
Our approach is that management [always acts in its own interests]. But [at] NUMSA, our 
understanding is that a trade union is reactionary in nature … a trade union that [attempts to 
be proactive will never get the better of  the situation]. Because as a trade union you always 
react to what has been given to [you]. 
 
Accordingly, as one shop steward states, the German approach is regarded with some scepticism by 
the South African colleagues. Here, the suspicion is raised that focusing too much on company 
policies results in the abandonment of  broader working class interests. 
 
With the works council representatives, we used to suspect that they were looking more at the 
interests of  the company than of  the union. […] Because … the works council has some 
limitations, you know. Sometimes they want to keep certain information confidential. 
Sometimes they have to… because they have access to information about their corporation. 
 
Among the German interviewees – especially those from the works council – a similar criticism is 
directed at the centralist structures of  NUMSA, which – according to them –would impede effective 
negotiation outcomes with South African management. Moreover, NUMSA representatives are not 
willing to make any concessions, aiming to keep production at the plant. The idea of  the works 
council representative on how to organise workers’ representation under conditions of  increasing 
competition is as follows: 
 
If  you’re asking, ‘how do I get a production order to Uitenhage?’, then you need to ask ‘how 
can I make the car cheaper? How can I organise production intelligently?’ 
 
He explains the co-management approach pursued by the works council as follows: 
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If  I consider what kind of  work we as works council and IG Metall are doing every day, it is 
entrepreneurial, managerial work. We’re managing workers’ interests, that’s what we like to call 
it. 
 
An example of  the difficulties that may arise from these diverging approaches can be found in an 
initiative put forward at the recommendation of  the German works council. In order to secure the 
existence of  the Uitenhage plant for the coming years, the German works council negotiated with 
management to allocate significant investment into a paint shop. As this modernisation measure was 
to be accompanied by job cuts, heavy resistance by NUMSA successfully blocked the initiative for a 
good while. At the same time, the involvement of  the Germans is not valued, but described by the 
NUMSA official as indifferent to the interests of  working-class members beyond their own 
company. 
 
Yes, we have shared perspectives about the economic and political situation. But there is no 
way that we discuss the politics of  the working class. They don’t seem interested. Although 
they are very interested in issues concerning the corporation. 
 
As the incidents indicate, together with the perspectives taken from the interviews, the South African 
trade unionists are not willing to adopt market logic into their political repertoire. While German 
representatives have long been engaging in co-managerial policies, such orientations cause scepticism 
among the South African colleagues. A similar divergence of  perspectives can be found in the 
negotiation of  major industrial action that took place at between 1999 and 2000. 
 
The Uitenhage strike, 1999–2000 
As an immediate consequence of  international competition in the course of  globalisation, the 
abovementioned China Export Agreement has served as a starting point for an ongoing negotiation 
process between NUMSA and local management. With the official aim of  “restructuring production 
to meet targets” (Buhlungu, 2008: 103), various rationalisation measures were to be implemented, 
including speeding up the assembly line, shortening tea breaks and extra pay for overtime on 
weekends. After local NUMSA representatives had finally agreed to accept the cuts, events 
culminated in a labour conflict that lasted from 1999 to 2000. A significant number of  workers 
carried out a wildcat strike against the recommendation of  the union. After repeatedly refusing to go 
back to work, 1 386 employees were dismissed by the company. 
What seems remarkable about the strike situation is the fact that the central cleavage line did 
not run between capital and labour, but within the labour movement itself: “What makes the strike 
both fascinating and perplexing is the fact that it arose out of  a dispute within the union, and one 
section of  the membership embarked on the strike, not against Volkswagen South Africa 
management but against union leadership” (Buhlungu, 2008: 93). 
That estimation is shared by Webster et al. (2009: 37), according to whom the “strikers felt 
betrayed by their own union which, in their view, was deviating from the historical tradition of  
worker control and internal democracy”. 
This complexity is also reflected in the variety of  explanations found in the literature. 
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Buhlungu (2008) identifies a general democracy deficit inside the union. As the NUMSA leadership 
had initially agreed to the rationalisation measures, it had lost its legitimacy among the members. 
Similarly, Forrest (2000) finds a general alienation of  the shop-stewards council from the workforce. 
An even stronger argument is made by Bolsmann (2010), who claims complicity between NUMSA 
and the capital side. 
Despite the complexity of  the local constellation, the German works council and IG Metall 
attempted to mediate between the parties, sending delegates to Uitenhage and Johannesburg. While 
he states that the initiative was generally welcomed, one of  the shop stewards explains his problem 
with the mediation strategy: 
 
Yes, it’s very difficult. We had some problems, because comrades from Germany, or 
colleagues from the German works council would come and spend most of  their time with 
management in South Africa. Not with us as a union. We [have] had problems. 
 
In the perspective of  the South African colleagues, the behaviour of  the German delegates seems 
problematic for two reasons. First of  all, in a situation of  internal instability and disorder, the intense 
contact of  the Germans with local management appears suspicious (especially against the 
background of  the general proximity between the German works council and management). In 
addition to the concrete political implications of  such an alliance, the German focus on management 
contacts is also regarded as containing a personal affront. 
 
The fight over flexible working-time arrangements during the crisis 
A third cause of  differences between ideas of  representative work lies in the introduction of  flexible 
working-time arrangements during the economic crisis of  2008–2009. As pointed out above, the 
application of  working-time accounts has enabled German social partners to maintain production 
and protect employment (at least among core employees). 
Aiming to even out changes in demand brought about by the crisis, local management 
proposed the implementation of  a similar model in Uitenhage, which was strongly opposed, 
especially by NUMSA. The most controversial aspect of  this proposal was a change in the overtime 
regulation. Here, the usual addition of  50 per cent of  the regular wage was no longer to be 
compensated financially. Instead of  receiving money, the additional labour would be transformed 
into bonus time stored in a virtual account. 
In order to understand the different perspectives on working-time accounts, it is not sufficient 
to refer to the different traditions of  representative work. Instead, it must be noted that these 
measures were taking place against the background of  the particular institutional settings in toto. In 
contrast to the German situation, poor living conditions in the Eastern Cape region – due to high 
unemployment, household debt and the absence of  sufficient welfare institutions – mean that, on 
average, 5.6 people depended on the job of  one Volkswagen worker (Webster et al., 2009: 48). 
These discrepancies, stemming from both economic framework conditions and particular 
political orientations, can clearly be identified in a heated debate about working-time accounts, which 
took place between local management, NUMSA and the shop stewards’ council. Dissatisfied with the 
solution, NUMSA representatives forced the shop stewards to resign. Besides the general concern 
about losing power to the shop-floor level, this stance taken by the union again corresponds to their 
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idea of  management’s and workers’ responsibilities. As one of  the NUMSA representatives explains, 
reactions to the international market situation in the crisis cannot legitimately be expected from the 
employees’ side: 
 
If  the global market situation brings sales problems, these are management problems. But we 
are responsible for the workers’ interests, not management interests. 
 
As is apparent in the quotes from the interviews with the works council, the attitude expressed by 
the NUMSA official is not compatible with the approach pursued by the German colleagues. From 
the South African perspective, their refusal to accept a flexible working-time regulation, connected 
with a threat to go on strike against it, is a symbol of  strength and resolve towards the company, 
regardless of  its economic implications. As one German representative states, attempts to mediate 
between the local parties have been ignored by both the local trade union officials and colleagues in 
Johannesburg. 
 
The impact of social memory on international cooperation 
Based on the three instances sketched out above, we shall argue that the central difficulty of  the 
working relationship between German and South African representatives is the memory of  what 
cooperation was like until the early 1990s. The shop stewards in particular criticise a lack of  attention 
to Uitenhage on the part of  the German colleagues. According to them, the only occasions at which 
they can explain what is going on at their plant are the bi-annual meetings of  VW’s world works 
council. Unfortunately, due to their limited timeframe and the number of  issues at stake within the 
global production network, these meetings do not provide an opportunity for mutual exchange. As 
several shop stewards point out, in the past such exchanges took place on a bilateral basis, not least 
through personal contacts. This is also highlighted by a representative from IG Metall, who has 
cooperated with the South African colleagues since the 1990s: 
 
Since the death of  John Gomomo and the departure of  Hans-Jürgen Uhl, there have been no 
more close relationships. It was not only the breakdown of  mutual trust through the 
conflicts. It was the irreplaceability of  this great friendship between them. 
 
Similar references to the relationship between the two can also be found in interviews with shop 
stewards and NUMSA officials. Moreover, anecdotes about concrete actions of  international 
solidarity, such as the smuggling of  money for the anti-apartheid struggle or mutual visits, when 
officials from both countries were invited to stay for several weeks with the families of  local 
colleagues, serve to illustrate the quality of  the good relationship in the past. 
Today, as one NUMSA colleague confirms, such contacts do not exist: 
 
No, it’s not the same. We don’t get to meet IG Metall, after InterSoli. Or it has disappeared. 
We used to meet with IG Metall during InterSoli. In the InterSoli era we did get to meet IG 
Metall. 
 
Differentiating the current situation from the past, a NUMSA representative gives credit to the 
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German representatives from the works council as well as from IG Metall for their support for the 
struggle against apartheid: 
 
Yes, remember, before the era of  globalisation it was easy. But now there is all this free trade 
and things have changed. During apartheid, because of  IG Metall, we managed to keep our 
shop stewards paid by the company even while in prison. In meetings in German companies, 
the police could not come and get us. But sometimes when they knew there were shop 
stewards they went straight inside the factories to get hold of  them. But [they] paid … legal 
fees for shop stewards. [They] also paid them wages while they were in prison. But now, 
because of  globalisation, things have changed, you know, because of  free trade and other 
things. 
 
While similar credit is given by one of  the shop stewards, he also refers to the shift in the provision 
of  such supporting measures, which, according to him, strongly decreased after the defeat of  
apartheid: 
 
Yes, under apartheid the solidarity group was very vocal. You see, with other people who 
were working here during the 1980s, they used to be detained. Because we had strong links 
with InterSoli. When they come back to visit, VW will not dismiss them. Because they were in 
the course of  liberating this country. Some will spend years but when they come back, they 
will be reinstated. This is what we had strongly expected. But since we’re free, this thing is not 
really continuing. 
 
In this sequence a strong interpretative contrast is constituted through the dichotomous perceptions 
of  past and present in the eyes of  the shop steward. To conclude this section we show how this is to 
be interpreted in relation to the question of  cross-border coordination among international workers’ 
representatives in connection with social memory. 
 
Summary of the empirical findings 
As the three instances of  international cooperation and their problematic implications indicate, local 
framework conditions in the two countries complicate mutual understanding as a precondition for a 
shared political position. German and South African representatives seem to choose their political 
demands in close connection to the respective institutional settings. While an interest-based 
explanation would highlight the fact that preferences derive from these particular framework 
conditions, the empirical material shows that a simple reference to these national institutional settings 
cannot fully explain the relationship between the national representatives. 
The interviews with the South African representatives show that experiences of  past 
cooperation with IG Metall in joint solidarity against the apartheid regime still constitute the 
interpretative framework applied to make sense of  contemporary cooperation. For example, the 
perception that German delegates decided to spend significant time with management in order to 
resolve the strike situation shows that the relationship between the national representatives is based 
on more than pure interest representation. Instead, the irritation of  the South African colleagues 
goes beyond a purely interest-based view. Similarly, what seems to be at stake in the discussion about 
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co-management or the introduction of  flexible working time models is not just the question of  how 
close the relationship between employers and employee representatives should be. Instead, these 
issues become instances of  realising and negotiating working-class identity. 
As we have shown, social memory plays a crucial role in these negotiation processes. In the 
sequences quoted from the interviews, references to such experiences as the friendship of  Uhl and 
Gomomo or the illegal transfer of  money from Germany to South Africa become a wildcard for 
“the good old times”, when mutual understating served as a solid basis for international cooperation. 
While it may well be that co-managerial arrangements translate into a model of  workers’ 
representation that is undesirable for the South African colleagues, from an interest-based 
perspective these discrepancies become especially virulent in terms of  their perception against the 
background of  the past. 
 
 
“Forward, without Forgetting” – Social Memory and International Workers’ 
Representation 
Drawing on a case of  international workers’ representation, this study has addressed the question of  
how workers’ memories in South Africa and Germany impact their collective ability to maintain 
solidaristic cooperation. Because sequences of  coordinated action in a world of  socialised actors 
never start from scratch but are instead made up of  ongoing sequences of  action, perceptions of  the 
past play a crucial role in the systematic understanding of  actions (and thus, in organisations). 
Drawing on the Negotiated Order approach, it could be shown how social memory serves as 
an orientation among the groups involved in international workers’ representation at Volkswagen. As 
the social world perspective reveals, negotiation processes are here embedded in transnational 
constellations. While this finding might not appear very surprising for the case of  MNCs, it should 
be taken into account that organisational memories still acquire their particular shapes within 
national boundaries. While the German institutional setting of  social partnership clearly influences 
the idea of  labour regulation as a co-managerial process, framework conditions in South Africa cause 
the local representatives to take a much more antagonistic position. As could be shown, it is exactly 
at this point that social memory works as an obstacle to mutual understanding. With the question of  
“temporal effects of  coordination between actors with different historicities and ambitions at 
different locations” (Hernes, 2014: X) at the core of  the future research agenda of  organisation 
studies, these insights might serve as a programmatic contribution in this regard. 
Given the potential value of  considering social memory in the cross-border coordination of  
labour politics, as shown in the case study, we can now ask about the implications for global labour 
studies in more general terms. Departing from the work of  Karl Polanyi (1957), a recent debate in 
this journal (Burawoy 2010) centred around the potential of  a global countermovement, 
complementing the globalisation of  capital through the establishment of  effective regulations. While 
it has been argued that international cooperation among workers’ representatives could eventually 
lead to what Pries and Seeliger (2013) termed an “international network texture of  labor regulation”, 
ambivalences in this development must be taken into account, as well. If  cross-border coordination 
implies, for example, an insistent demand for the South African representatives to adopt co-
managerial patterns that (seemingly) privilege the shop-floor level at the cost of  the central trade 
union structures, can we still speak of  a general strengthening of  workers’ counter-power? 
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A central challenge for both global labour studies and the protagonists of  the global labour 
movement, I would argue, is to take into account the ambivalences and contradictions inside this 
countermovement. While internal diversity is not necessarily a weakness for international labour 
(Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman, 2013), in order to access this diversity as a potential resource for 
strategic action, it will be necessary to show a great deal of  sensitivity towards the local backgrounds. 
“Forward without forgetting!” – while originally referring to working-class power stemming from 
solidaristic cohesion in general, the chorus of  the famous solidarity song by Berthold Brecht and 
Hanns Eissler can alternatively be read along the lines of  the questions addressed in this article. The 
emergence of  transnational cultures of  memory in such international contexts has the potential to 
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